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FOOD, HUNGER, POVERTY AND FAMINE IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA: 
The Inhuman Faces Of Failed Development
By Reginald Herbold Green
Sweet and cloying through the dark air 
Falls the stifling scent of despair;
The forms take shape in the dark air:
?uss-purr of leopard, footfall of padding bear 
Palm-pat of nodding ape, square hyena waiting 
For laughter, laughter, laughter. The Lords of hell 
are here.
- T. S. Eliot
What do you want to be when you grow up?
Alive.
- UNICEF African Poster 1985
Do not go gentle into that good night...
But rage rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
...the present emergency in Africa not... a short-term crisis 
brought on by any one exceptional circumstance but rather as a 
surfacing of a long term crisis of poverty and underdevelopment. 
...malnutrition and ill health... claim the lives of nearly four 
million African children each and every year - even when there is 
no drought, no famine, no camps, no epidemics, and no media 
coverage. This is the 'silent emergency* which, exacerbated by 
war and drought, has suddenly become the 'loud emergency' of 
which all the world has heard.
- James Grant, Executive Director 
UNICEF, 1985
Frustrations and failures will continue to mount if we do not 
immediately summon the courage to revise the ways we think and 
take action - as well as maintaining essential services to 
support life and health. ...Saving hundreds of thousands... who 
are at risk of dying fom malnutrition or infection is an 
immediate imperative. But it must be only one stage in the 
progress toward other activities, and one element in the truly 
comprehensive approach...
- Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Minister 
for Planning and Cooperation of 
Senegal, President, Environment 
and Development in the Third 
World (ENDA), 1985
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The Loud Emergency
The predominant public image of sub-Saharan Africa in the North today is that 
of a starving child starkly portrayed on a televison screen. For the 
professional economist it is probably a statistical series which - with a few 
short deviations - trends steadily down. For the recurrent concerned 
professional visitor it is the growing number of cases in which present 
reality in luxury hotels, urban slums and rural areas looks starkly worse than 
his stored up images of ten or even twenty to twenty five years ago and 
contrast even more starkly with remembered high points of the middle or late 
1 9 7 0s.
Over 1976-79 sub-Saharan Africa had recovered from the 1973-75 economic shocks 
associated with grain, oil and industrial economy manufactured goods price 
explosions. Growth averaged over 5% a year - comparable to the developing 
country average and above any previous four year run in SSA. Even the 
external balance position (buoyed in many cases by a beverage price boom) and 
the food supply situation (bolstered by relatively good weather, lower grain 
import prices and more forex to spend) looked moderately good in a majority of 
countries.
Beneath this apparently benign surface three time-bombs were ticking:
1. African trend food ouput growth had been below that of population since 
the middle or late 1 9 6 0s and had not responded to sharp terms of trade 
shifts in grower prices in favour of food over other agricultural 
products and - in a majority of cases - also relative to wages and cost 
of living;
2 . the apparent balance of payments stability was an illusion resting on a
temporary terms of trade recovery (which in fact did not include mineral
export based economies) and on acceleration of borrowing on worsening
terms at a period of above average export earnings growth;
3 . the "silent emergency" of endemic hunger and malnutrition, grinding
poverty and sickness, overwork and avoidable death remained the reality 
confronting millions of Afrians who remained in absolute poverty and very 
vulnerable to any downward shock pushes.
By 1984 the panorama had changed totally. The silent emergency had risen to a
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screaming crescendo. Per capita output had fallen in each year from 1980 and 
in respect to economies with a majority of SSA's population was back to or 
beneath 1 9 7 0 s levels.
External balance - rent by sudden terms of trade collapse and an extended 
recession at global economic level and weighed down by rising interest and 
repayments charges against static or falling real grant and loan inflows - was 
for most countries a fading memory not a realistic short term goal much less a 
present reality. The continuing trend decline in per capita food production 
had been starkly highlighted by drought and civil war/external aggression.^
Famine stalked a quarter of the continent and severe hunger over a half. 
Quality of life indicators showed a stark reality of human misery for SSA as a 
whole. For the most severely affected countries like Ghana a long term 
downward trend (Table 1) had become apparent.
The emergency efforts to avoid mass death did and do relate to an immediate 
overriding necessity. For the dead there is no future. By themselves they do 
not answer what one is keeping people alive for in the sense of what they will 
be able to make of their lives.
Mass starvation in Sub-Saharan Africa to date has been triggered by the 
interaction of drought, weak transport systems and war (and threatened, albeit 
to date averted, when the first two interacted particularly savagely but the 
third was absent). But it has been triggered both because the margin between 
’normal’ food supply and starvation is narrow, and increasingly narrowing in a 
majority of the region's countries, and because most poor households have 
neither the self employment nor wage employment opportunity either to grow 
enough to eat or to be productive and well rewarded enough to buy adequate 
food. In normal years inability to buy food - not its physical unavailability 
- is the main cause of urban malnutrition (cf Reutlinger, 1985). That reality 
underlies the famine crises and remains even when reasonable rains return (see 
Please, 1985 and Green, 1985b; Figure 1, Table 2) - as they did in most, not 
all, drought affected areas in the 1984-85 cropping seasons. Furthermore, 
peasants who have lost herds, tools, seed and other means of farming, 
especially if also driven from their homes into urban areas or relief camps by 
the search for food cannot resume production as if nothing had happened. 
Flight from the land will be both difficult and slow to reverse (cf Burki, 
1985).
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TABLE 1
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS *
1 9 6 0 - MID 1980 1 s
Ghana
Late Low Income Sub-
1 9 6 0 1970 1970's 1980's Saharan Africa
1 . Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth 45 49 55
(1 9 8 2 ) 
53 48
2 . Infant Mortality Rate 1 3 2 107 86 107-120 1 1 8
3- Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 24
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b) - - - 30 45
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person 
Per Year 0.7 0.4 2 (f)
6 . Health Budget as 
% of GDP - 1 . 2 - 0 . 2 6 0.95
7. Access to Pure Water (c) 
Rural 
Urban 
Total
-
14
86
35
14
86
35
48
75
60
14
62
2 2
8 . Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
- 40
92
55
40
95
5o
30 
65 ■ 
44
25
69
32
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements 92 97 88 68 91
1 0 . Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe) - - 36 50-55 40
1 1 . Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e) 38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(8 0 ) 69 (-)
1 2 . Adult Literacy 27 30 - 35-45 44
13. Education Budget as 
% of GDP - 3-9 - 0.85 2 . 8 1
14. Proportion of Population 
below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural
Urban
- - 60-65
30-35
6 7 - 1/2-
72-1/2
45-50
65
35
/5
Table 1 (continued)
Principal
Notes:
Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division,
Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), 
World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on 
Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF 
Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (July
1984); Ghana country data.
a) 1 9 6 0 data refer to a year between 1 9 5 9 and 1 9 6 1 ; 1 9 7 0 between 
1969 and 1971; late 1 9 7 0 ’s between 1975 and 1 9 8 0 ; 1 9 8 0 's to 
1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. May
overstate for urban population when facilities available are
small to serve the entire population nominally within reach of 
them.
c) 1 9 7 0 and late 1 9 7 0 's urban figures may be overstated by failing 
to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1 9 7 0 and 1 9 7 8 figures for urban and possibly rural areas
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed 
user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana 
has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author on basis of fragmentary data.
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Figure 1 Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought, 1970-1984
1970 1975 1980 1984
S o u r c e  World Bank. T ow ard  S u sta in ed  D evelopm en t in S u b -S a h a r a n  A fr ica : A Jo in t  P rog ram  o f  A ction  (Washington. D C . .  19841. p. 14; ba.ied on data 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (F A Ó ).  except that the 1984 figure is a projection using data from FAO , the United 
States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of Agriculture.
T a b l e  2  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  Im p o r t s  o f  C e r e a l s  i n  A f r i c a
(million tonnes)
A frica S u b -Sa h a ra n
A fr ic a f1)
1970 1975 1980 1983 1969-71 1 9 8 0 -8 2
P r o d u c t i o n  
T o ta l  Cereals 6 1 1 67-5 70-8 62-7 35-6 41 8
— W heat 8 0 9-7 8-9 9 0 1 -2 1-4
— Rice 7-3 7-8 8-4 8-6 4-7 6-2
— Maize 21-7 24-9 27-2 22-4 12-1 13-8
F o o d  Production 
per capita (index:
1 9 7 6 = 1 0 0 ) 104 100 95 CO oo — —
I m p o r t s ( 2)
T o ta l  Cereals 13-1 22-0 25-9 2-3 8-7
— W heat 10-4 15-7 17-4 1 0 3-3
— R ice 0-7 2-4 3-2 0-7 2-5
— Maize 1-4 3-4 4-5 0-4 1-7
I m p o r t s  a s  a  p e r  c e n t  
o f  R e o u i r e m e n t s ( 3) 
T o ta l  Cereals 16-3 Í 23-7 29-2 6-2 17-2
-  W heat 51-7 k  
8-2 X
63-8 65-9 45-6 7 0 ■ 5
— R ice 22-2 27-1 12-6 2 8 ?
— M aize 5-3 11-1 16-7 3-1 10-9
(^ A v e rag e  annual volume.
( ^ I m p o r ts  for total A frica  are higher than for su b -S ah aran  A frica  reflecting the 
impact o f  certain north A trican countries which are substantial cereal importers 
(e.g. Algeria, Egypt, M o ro c c o ,  Tunisia).
(•^Requirements are here defined as production plus imports.
So u rces :  F A O — Prod uction Y e a r b o o k ,  1976, 1981, 1983.
F A O — T rad e Y e a r b o o k ,  1976, 1981, 1983.
W orld  B a n k — T ow ard s  Sustained Development in Su b -Sah aran  
Africa, 1984.
Table 2 - Reproduced 
from P. Ndegwa and 
A. Fenwick, Food Crisis 
In Africa: Policy And 
Research Issues, February- 
1986, IFPRI Board Paper,
N airobi.
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With the exception of countries plagued by civil war (Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan) 
or external aggression (Angola, Mozambique) mass deaths from starvation were 
averted even when (as in, e.g. Mali and Burkina Faso) food output was very 
hard hit indeed and transport infrastructure and fleets exiguous in the 
extreme. In 1985 GDP growth was of the order of 3*4$ - in excess of 
population growth for the first time since 1 9 7 9 and the external balance gap 
was distinctly lower. 1986 may well be similar or better. A return to 
1976-79? A turning point?
Hardly. Over half of the 1985 growth appears to have come from agricultural 
recovery out of an extremely poor 1984 trough with both trough and recovery 
largely explicable in terms of weather. P.er capita food availability
(averaged over SSA) is still barely above 90% of FAO norms - radically less 
for at least a third of SSA's countries and human beings. That kind of 
recovery will last as long as the good weather years and if mistaken for a 
true trend shift will lay the foundation for a yet louder emergency when the 
drought returns. 1 9 8 6 's out-turn will be buoyed by continued favourable
weather and except for oil exporters (Angola, Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria) by 
the dramatic fall in oil prices.
The balance of this study first reviews the history of poverty in Africa from 
the pre-colonial context through the apparent breakthrough to development in 
the 1960s and 1976-79 to the post 1979 crisis. Special attention is focused 
on the impact of the present crises on poor human beings. The relationship of 
emergency survival aid to rehabilitation support is reviewed as are a series 
of themes for including structural adjustment away from hunger and poverty in 
a production and balance oriented structural adjustment strategy.
The basic analytical arguments underlying the study are:
1 . hunger and poverty have remained intractable in SSA for centuries but 
have altered radically in form and since 1 9 7 9 increased in degree;
2 . the basic cause is production growth failure in agriculture generally 
compounded by import capacity and real income falls outside agriculture;
3 . therefore, redistribution without enhanced production (including raising 
relative prices of agricultural products without significant increases in
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production possibilities) cannot be adequate;
4. because who produces dominates distribution for poor Africans to have 
greater access to food they must produce more (more food for the rural 
majority of the undernourished, more income to buy food for the urban 
poor);
5. more production by Africans is feasible and in many cases at lower scarce 
resource (including foreign exchange, fixed capital and skilled 
managerial personnel) costs than by large farmers or farming corporations 
(public or private). Knowledge (or its absence) and political inertia or 
self-interest hamper shifts in that direction but do not necessarily 
prevent them;
6. These factors also apply to "loud emergencies" - the severely drought 
affected people and countries need first to survive and at the same time 
to be assisted in rehabilitating production;
7. the necessity for African leadership (and perhaps rather less, less 
sweepingly global and less pre-emptory external ’advice') and effort is 
real (as Africans have recognied) but without initial increases in net 
resources inflows to break import strangulation nooses the probable 
results of African efforts will not be adequate to reverse 1979-85 trends 
generally let alone in respect to food production and hunger.
Transitions From Poverty To Poverty
Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is an historic fact - as it is virtually 
univerally. There was no golden age before the Europeans came when the land 
flowed with sorghum, millet and yams, with guinea fowl, cattle and fish, with 
palm oil, groundnuts and garden eggs, with banana beer, coconut spirits and 
palm wine so that all were well fed and prosperous. But it would be equally 
false to treat poverty as primordial, unchanging and - implicitly 
permanently immutable and inevitable.
Pre-colonial poverty turned primarily on sub-marginal or erratic rainfall and 
on techonological (and therefore productivity) limitations in relation to
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Sub-Saharan Africa's, on average poor and difficult soils. The human 
condition was equally constrained by inadequate health knowledge, practices 
and services which shortened life and eroded strength. Africans, not 
Europeans, have always been the chief victims of African diseases and 
so-called adult African resistance to, for example, malaria often means no 
more (and no less) than that vulnerable individuals died of it as children.
None of this denies that Africans did develop technologies: some long fallow 
rotation systems (so-called "shifting cultivation") related admirably and 
sustainably to poor soils with limited, uncertain rainfall so long as 
populations were small and the only large demand on the land was for food; 
some herbal and para-psychological medical practices were far more than common 
sense or trial and error. Still less does it deny cultural and social 
achievements. The fact remains that for many Africans hunger was an annual 
occurrence, disease a frequent one, life short, and death an ever present 
danger unleashable by unpredictable and technologically unmanageable weather 
shifts and disease outbreaks.
Pre-colonial neo-colonialism - of slave traders and merchants manipulating 
African polities and agents in ways analagous to those used by external 
governments and companies in post colonial neo-colonialism a century later - 
unleashed two additional causes of poverty and human misery. The first was 
the slave trade and the social and economic wastelands it created (still writ 
plain in the low present population of most of Nigeria’s middle belt almost a 
century after that trade ceased). The second was the rise in the number and 
ferocity of wars - and the killing power available to armies - largely 
directly or indirectly triggered and/or made possible by European and, 
secondarily, Arabian interventions (see Rodney, 1972).
Colonial Political Economy And African Poverty
Colonialism in Africa rarely meant territorial economic development even in 
modern macro economic terms. Gross territorial product - as opposed to 
certain products of use to the colonising power and its trading partners - was 
rarely of central concern. James Mill's definition of a colony as a place in 
which the colonising power found it convenient to carry out some of its 
business (e.g. mining, cutting tropical timber, buying or growing tropical
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crops) provides much more insight into the nature of economic policy than any 
definition presupposing colonies were seen primarily as territorial economic 
units in their own right.
As a direct result, poverty of Africans was not an economic concern which 
could appear on the colonial agenda as more than a footnote. A large export 
sector with a supporting food and service sector could on occasion reduce 
poverty - a result not unwelcome to many colonial administrators. Avoiding 
mass starvation (by price juggling, reserve holding, famine relief and even 
food for work policies which have a haunting familiarity of kind if not scale 
to 1970s and 1980s efforts) were sometimes priorities - e.g. in the then 
Tanganyika Mandate - and did end mass starvation. But Adam Smith's dictum on 
the need for the majority to be non-poor and non-miserable as a pre-condition 
for colonial economic success would have been either incomprehensible or seen 
as at least as subversive as the writings of Karl Marx.^
Education for Africans was perceived either as a by-product of missionary 
endeavour (vaguely backed, tolerated or curtailed in terms of its supposed
social and political impact - which was usually far more and far more deeply 
'subversive' than colonial administrators, or missionaries!, realised) or as 
an investment in clerks, semi-skilled labour and other human intermediate 
inputs into the colonial economy. The calculations were not in sophisticated 
econometric terms, but colonial education policy was early (and severely cost 
constrained) human resource development school in concept - even when it
flowered to secondary and medical assistant levels. Health facilities for 
Africans (and until late in the colonial period often for Europeans^) were
even more exiguous and dependent on missionary subsidisation of the colonial 
state.
However, the nature of poverty changed. Colonial rule did reduce death from
war (caused by dislocation and subsequent starvation or epidemic disease more
than by battle casualties); it did end the slave trade; frequently it did 
provide fail-safe famine relief against mass starvation. These shifts 
probably both increased life expectancy and (by reducing dislocation) raised 
rates of increase of food production. Exploitative as it was, colonial
production promotion/coercion on average probably raised the command of many
African households over goods and services. While there were exceptions
(especially in the case of settler colonies), the territories in which most
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Africans were most likely to be poor and miserable were those like then Haute 
Volta in which, a la Joan Robinson’s formulation, the colonial power and its 
enterprises could find no worthwhile way of exploiting them.
Poverty - or at least human deprivation - was also altered in its nature in 
additional ways. The first was the imposition of external rule with its
impact on polity, society, self image and self set standards - clearly a 
negative shift. The second was the beginnings of education and health 
services which both improved the human condition of recipients and gave them - 
and other Africans - a fuller picture of what they were (for whatever reason) 
still deprived of (a much greater force in both aspects with the late colonial 
education and health services ’boom’). The third was an increase in 
population growth (presumably related to the indirect effects of law and order 
including famine relief and ability to produce more) which began to create 
pressure on land of plausible quality and security of rainfall (most severely 
where colonists or plantations had reduced the supply available). This trend 
was probably not very significant in most areas at the time but laid the 
foundations for much more generalised and severe problems over the last twenty 
years.
1960—1979: Development by Modernisation, Poverty By Inertia and Invisibility
Development - or at least growth and expansion of both production and basic 
services - speeded up in the region as a whole and in most Sub-Saharan 
economies over the two decades after independence. The dominant basic pattern 
was arguably a more intensive colonial mise en valeur emphasis on 
modernisation and expansion of selected output sub-sectors and related 
infrastructure, paralleled by more intensive and extensive human resource 
investment oriented education, and rather more attention to health and water 
supply. However at least one sectoral addition - import substitution 
industry, one sub-sectoral shift - toward high capital intensity irrigated and 
mechanised agriculture and one perspective shift - to see an African state as 
a self contained unit for policy purposes (not an appendage of a broader unit 
centred abroad) were increasingly evident over time.
Output per capita and service provision coverage did rise (see World Bank, 
1981). The advance was uneven - the least favoured countries in natural 
resource or location terms and those with chronic policy failures did not
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share significantly in it slow and unstable, but real. Ironically on 
average the best four years were 1976-79, the recovery following the 1973-75 
shocks and preceeding the 1 9 8 0 —1 9 8 5 debacle.
Poverty defined as low income household ability to meet basic consumption 
needs was neither rapidly nor consistently reduced. The basic cause was a 
failure of wages and reasonably productive self employment to rise much - if 
at all - more rapidly than population plus a failure of productivity increases 
to become accessible to the poorest quarter to half of peasant households. 
Basic service accessibility did rise, albeit often so slowly that absolute 
numbers without access rose even though a growing share of the people was 
served.
While mass starvation was - with very rare exceptions - averted, it is 
doubtful that seasonal, cyclical and endemic hunger were reduced markedly. 
From about 1965 on food, and from 1970 overall, agricultural production growth 
lagged behind that of population - a source of subsequent immiseration on 
three counts: increasing inability to meet domestic food requirements from
domestic production; falling per household cash income from sale of food or 
other crops; and falling export earnings and therefore ability to sustain 
overall capacity utilisation and maintenance or growth in the early and middle 
1 9 7 0s and more especially since 1 9 7 9 .
The reasons for agricultural malaise are complex, are not clearly understood 
(especially in terms of -weight and interaction) and until the 1 9 8 0s had very 
distinct divergences from country to country. In respect to poor farmers 
three stand out: concentration of resources in ways which left the small,
isolated farmer with a low initial income unable to raise output; increasing 
population/land ratios and static proven knowledge (and access to inputs), 
leading to smaller holdings, more intensive land use unsustainable under 
existing systems, pushing on to poorer and or higher weather-risk land. As 
these households usually produce primarily domestic food crops (with sales for 
cash a deduction from what are often already at least marginally inadequate 
self provisioning) and effective domestic food prices after 1 9 6 0 did not in 
general show a cyclical fall relative to wages, there is some doubt how 
significant peasant/worker terms of trade shifts and state price policy 
(rarely effective for domestic food crops) were directly, except for the 
minority who produced export crops which clearly did suffer from world and 
domestic terms of trade shifts and increases in (public and also private)
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marketing costs relative to export prices.
While still a small proportion of total absolutely poor households, urban
poverty (in low productivity informal sector self or wage employment) began to 
grow very rapidly. Whether the urban absolutely poor households were much 
less poor than the poorest half of peasant households in physical consuming 
power terms is unclear and probably varied sharply among countries. What
they did have was somewhat better access to basic services and a far higher 
chance - at least for some - to win their way out of absolute poverty than 
that of most of the poorer half of peasant households.
In the 1970s concern about low growth of employment and of rural household
incomes led to a substantial employment, technology, urban renewal and rural
development studies industry and some pilot projects,^ most to fall victim to
post 1979 increases in resource stringency. Likewise concern over low food
production growth led to increased real resource (including infrastructural
investment and marketing working capital), institutional and policy attention
to this sub-sector often with renewed concentration of attention away from
poor households and in most cases with no very evident net positive impact on 
7production. Finally the late 1960s/early 1970s falling off of growth and the 
negative 1974-75 growth during the first external shock crises led (during the 
1 9 7 6 - 7 9  high growth period) to a set of studies which formed the basis of the 
new conventional wisdom on stabilisation and structural adjustment appearing 
as they did after the 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 9 development dynamic had gone into reverse in 
almost all of Sub-Saharan Africa.
1979 ~ 19?? • The Resurgence of Poverty
Since 1979 the general performance of the region's economies has been 
disastrous (Tables 1,3)- The combination of negative per capita physical 
output growth, falling external terms of trade and declining net external 
resource inflows (absolutely as well as per capita) have reduced real per 
capita command over resources to below 1970 levels for Sub-Saharan Africa as a
g
whole. The World Bank's optimistic projections suggest no regional real 
output per capita recovery over 1 9 8 5 - 9 5 and possibly some further 
deterioration on net per capita inflows and terms of trade (World Bank, 1984),
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Table 3 Basic Indicators
Population  
(m illions) 
m id - 1982
Area  
(thou sands  
o f  square  
kilom eters)
G N P
D ollars
1982
per capitaJ
A verage 
annual 
grow th rate 
I percent) 
1960-32h
A verage annual 
rate o f inflation  
(percent)
Life 
expectancy  
at birth  
(years) 
1982
Index o f  
food  produ ction  
per  capita  
(1969-71  = W0) 
average fo r  
1980-821960-70 1 970-8>
Low -tncom e econom ies 213.5  t 12 ,992 t 249 w 0 .7  w 2 .6  m 10.8 m 49 w 86 w
L o iv -in c o m e  s em ia r ic i 29 .3  t 4 ,714  t 218 w - 0 . 1  w 3 .4  m 9.8 m 44 w 85 w
1 Chad 4.6 1.284 80 - 2.8 4.6 7.8 44 95
2 Mali 7.1 1,240 180 1.6 5.0 9.8 45 83
3 Burkina Faso 6.5 274 210 1.1 1.3 9 .7 44 95
4 Somalia 4.5 638 290 - 0.1 4.5 12.6 39 60
5 Niger 5.9 1,267 310 - 1 . 5 2.1 12.1 45 88
6 Gambia,  The 0 .7 11 360 2.5 2.2 9 .7 36 74
L o iv - in c o m e  o th e r 184.2  t 8 ,278  t 254 w 0 .9  w 2.6  m 11.7  m 49 w 36 w
7 Ethiopia 32.9 1 , 22 140 1.4 2.1 4.0 47 32
8 Guinea-Bissau 0.8 36 170 - 1 . 7 7.1 38 88
9 Zaire 30.7 2,345 190 - 0 . 3 29.9 35.3 50 87
10 Malawi 6.5 118 210 2.6 2.4 9.5 44 99
11 Uganda 13.5 236 230 - 1.1 3 .2 47.4 47 86
12 Rwanda a.a 26 260 1.7 13.1 13.4 46 105
13 Burundi 4.3 28 280 2.5 2.3 12.5 47 96
14 Tanzania 19.8 945 280 1.9 1.8 11.9 52 88
15 Benin a./ 113 310 0.6 1.9 9.6 48 100
16 Central African Rep, 2.4 623 310 0.6 4.1 12.6 48 104
17 Guinea 5 7 246 310 1.5 1.5 3.3 38 89
18 Madagascar 9.2 587 320 - 0 . 5 3.2 11.5 48 94
19 Togo 2.8 57 340 2.3 1.3 8.8 47 39
20 G h an a 12.2 239 360 - 1 . 3 7.5 39.5 55 72
21 Kenya 18.1 583 390 2.8 1.6 10.1 57 88
22 Sierra Leone 3.2 390 0.9 ia 2 38 81
23 M ozam bique 12.9 802 51 68
M id dle-incom e oil im porters 56.1  t 5 ,959  t 634 w 0.9  w 2.4  m 11.4  m 49 w 91 w
24 Su d an 20.2 2,506 440 - 0 . 4 3.9 15,2 47 87
25 Mauritania 1.6 1,031 470 1.4 2.1 3 .7 45 73
26 Liberia 2.0 111 490 0.9 1.9 8.5 54 38
27 Senegal 6.0 196 490 (■) 1.8 7.9 44 93
28 Lesotho 1.4 30 510 6.5 -> *T 11 4 53 84
29 Zambia b.O 753 640 - 0.1 7.6 8.7 51 87
30 Z imbabw e 7.5 391 850 1.5 1.1 8.4 56 37
31 Botswana 0.9 600 900 6.8 2.4 11.5 60 73
32 Sw aziland 0.7 17 940 4.2 2.4 12.8 54 107
33 Ivorv Coast 8 9 322 950 2.1 2.8 12.4 47 107
34 Mauritius 0.9 1,240 2.1 a a 15.0 66 110
M id dle-incom e oil exp orters 110.3  t 3 ,256  t 889 w 3.2 w 4.5 m 12.6 m 50 w 92 w
35 Nigeria 90.6 924 860 3.3 4.0 14.4 50 92
36 C am eroon 9.3 475 390 2.6 4.2 10.7 53 102
37 Congo,  P eople 's  Rep. 1.7 342 1.180 2.7 4.7 10.8 60 81
38 G abon 0 .7 268 4.000 4.4 5.4 19.5 49 93
39 A ngola 8.0 1,247 43
Su b-Saharan A frica 380 .0  t 22 ,207  t 491 w 1.5 w 2.7  m 11.4 m 49 w 88 w
All low -in com e coun tries 2 ,2 6 6 .5  t 29 ,097  t 280 t 3 .0  w 3.2 m 11.5 m 59 w 110 w
All low er m id d le-in com e
countries 669 .6  t 20 ,952  t 340 w 3.2 w 2.9  m 11.7  m 56 w 108 w
All upper m idd ie-incom e
countries 488 .7  t 22 ,079  t 2 ,490  w 4.1 w 3 .0  m 16.4 m 65 w 115 w
Industrial m arket econom ies 722 .9  t 30 ,935  t 11 ,070 w 3 .3  w 4 .3  m 9.9  m 75 w 114 w
S o te :  For data comparability  and coverage  see the technical  notes.
a. See the technical notes.
b. Because data tor the early 19b0s are not always available,  figures in italics are for periods other than that specified .
c. Figures in italics are for 1970-81,  not 1970-82.
Source: The World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in
Africa: A Joint Program of Action, 1984.
Sub-Saharan
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On what has caused this massive shift of direction there is substantial
agreement that external shocks (including weather), narrow margins for riding 
them out and the cumulative impact of over a decade and a half of agricultural 
non-success were major factors (see Wheeler 1984 for an econometric analysis). 
There is also agreement that government policies were not optimal (not that 
they had been over 1 9 6 0 - 7 9 either) and were adjusted to contextual disasters 
too slowly and that for some polities civil war/state disintegration and/or 
external aggression, which - e.g. - cost the nine SADCC states about $10,000 
million over 1980/84 or well over total external resource inflows for the 
period, (SADCC, 1985) were also decisive causes. The specific weights of
particular causes (and especially their interaction and their applicability to 
specific countries) are not agreed (see Allison and Green, 1985 and sources at 
note 2 ) nor are the directions in which policies erred (as opposed to fairly 
pervasive overambition in scope and underperformance in practice).
The impact of economic contraction on poor people has not been analysed
consistently, comprehensively nor coherently. For this there are at least
four reasons:
1 . social and human condition indicators are not as widely, uniformly,
regularly or carefully estimated as more narrowly economic ones so that 
data is usually fragmentary, of doubtful inter temporal or intra country 
comparability and even less accurate than that in macro economic
estimates;
2 . structural changes - e.g. the apparent rise in the proportion of
asecondary and informal incomes especially among the urban poor - have
not been mapped empirically rendering many indicators either dated or
based on implausible assumptions;
3 . there is a lag between economic contraction and clear downturns in some
indicators - especially those (e.g. education, health) where quality may 
fall drastically while quantity is still rising - and a further lag until 
data are collected - published - analysed (e.g. infant mortality 
estimates based on intercensual comparisons then to be up to a decade
behind current reality and to mask shifts in tend between censuses);
4. overriding macro economic and human survival (anti-starvation) - and in
In
d
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some cases state survival - concerns have pushed analysis of, as well as 
action on, human condition indicators into the background. Indeed when 
it is felt that nothing can be done to halt their decline (or that 
economic recovery is both necessary and sufficient for reversing that 
decline) there is a distinct desire 'not to know'.
Thus in 1984 UNICEF's Impact Of World Recession On Children was able to 
produce a broad array of suggestive and scattered empirical data but not a set 
of statistics comparable to those in the World Bank's annual World Development 
Reports. This was especially true for Sub-Saharan Africa (see Singer and 
Green, 1984). The annual Statistics On Children In UNICEF Assisted Countries 
(UNICEF, 1985) illustrates the fragmentary nature of relevant data (and the 
three year time lag for attaining even moderately incomplete global coverage).
Figure 2  Index of food production per capita, 1961-1965— 1983
119 6 1 -1 965 av era g e  =  100)
ave rag e
S ou rce. World Bank, T ow ard  S u sta in ed  D evelopm en t in S u b -S a h a ra n  A fr ic a : 4 Jo in t  P rog ram  o f  A ction  ( Washington, D C ,  1984) , p. 15; based on data 
provided by the Lnited States Department of Agriculture.
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But a number of main topographical elements of the development of poverty can 
be drawn. Food production per capita is still declining secularly - and in 
the early 1 9 8 0s was severely cyclically affected by a drought belt extending 
from the Cape Verdes through the Sahel to the Sudan and down through the Horn
and East Africa to the Cape and back to the Atlantic coasts of Namibia and
Angola. The officially estimated ratio of average calorie availability
relative to basic requirements fell to 80 per cent in many cases and under 70
per cent in some - a chilling figure when one realises that it means that at
least half the human beings in these countries have still less food than 
that. What micro data exist suggest that the farmers hardest hit fall into 
several sub-groups:
a. victims of sustained drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous 
sources of income (including herds, seed stock, land improvements) have 
been wiped out;
b. the - usually poor, often female headed - households pushed by land 
hunger onto more marginal (in terms of soil, weather, ecological 
fragility) land - i.e. the pioneers of the 'rural sponge' effect which 
has to date limited the rise of open unemployment;
c. households in isolated or peripheral (to main urban centres) areas who 
tend to be physically and institutionally (including for private
enterprise) at the end of the line for all goods and services and to 
suffer first and most severely from decreased flow levels;
d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self provisioning but also 
selling food, even if in nutritional terms they have a deficit,1”1 because 
it is their basic source of cash income - who are unable to increase or 
even sustain output in the face of static applicable knowledge and 
declining access to inputs.
Effective food prices have risen relative to wages and usually to prices but
for the groups cited this does litle or no good because of stagnant or falling
output. Non-food crop prices have tended to fall in real terms - often 
dramatically - partly relating to terms of trade internationally, partly to 
currency overvaluation and partly to rising marketing costs. This has 
probably affected poor peasants less severely for two reasons: many non-food
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crop producers are not among tne poorest peasant households; and switches from 
non-food to food crops by poor peasant households have been particularly 
marked (at least in some areas). However, there are poor peasant households 
presently or formerly primarily dependent on non-food crops for cash income 
who have been severely affected including (e.g. in Northern and Upper Ghana) 
by having to sell more of their already inadequate food production.
Formal recorded wage employment in the region as a whole has been nearly 
static since 1979. Meanwhile real wages have fallen sharply - often to the 
point at which second and third incomes are essential to household survival. 
As open unemployment is not common - only those who are not absolutely poor or 
can depend on relatives can afford to be unemployed - this implies a rapid 
growth in informal sector self and non-recorded wage employment. Here too 
there was clearly a 'sponge effect' in the 1 9 7 0s, but one which appears to be 
running into productivity and market limits in the 1 9 8 0s at least for most 
young, uneducated and female informal sector members.
Public service provision has fallen. The basic reasons are budgetary 
stringency (with falls in real expenditure levels on health, education and 
water common and draconic ones not uncommon) and foreign exchange shortages 
(leading to missing drugs, pump spares, textbooks, transport, etc). In some 
cases quantity of services has fallen markedly - e.g. rural health in Zambia 
and Ghana. In more, quality has declined, e.g. generalised shortages of 
school and medical service materials and maintenance. Supply and/or 
useability of nominally available services is severely constrained (e.g. on 
average 25 per cent of rural water supply units in Tanzania are out of service 
at any one time because of missing spares or fuel).
The decline in services has pressed particularly hard on end of the line areas 
- isolated rural districts and urban slums - and on those with rapidly growing 
populations, again especially urban slums but also some resettlement schemes. 
Or, more accurately, it has pressed particularly heavily on the poor people 
living in them. The rise of private primary schools and clinics in poor urban 
areas does indeed indicate that poor Africans value these services but also 
that the state supplied ones are less and less available and/or more and more 
unsatisfactory.
Raising or reintroducing fees for basic services has had a negative effect on
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access of the poor to health and education, but how much is unclear. This is
true because there is no uniform pattern of fee levels (in some cases they are
probably progressive relative to income but not in others), waiver
possibilities and collection levels and because their supposed use to restore 
or sustain service levels is not to date very evident.
The most recent life expectancy and mortality data suggest that the health 
service cuts may - in several cases - have halted or reversed the slow
improvement of life expectancy and decline of infant mortality trends which
characterised Sub-Saharan Africa over 1960-79. More dramatically diseases 
nearly eradicated in the late 1 9 5 0s and 1 9 6 0s (e.g. yaws and yellow fever in 
Ghana) have erupted at epidemic levels and remained endemic because funds and 
transport limited counter campaign duration and coverage. Moderate and severe 
child malnutrition has reached levels of 3 0 per cent or above in most
countries for which data exist and is approaching 50 per cent in some even
excluding famine crisis years (UNICEF, 1985 and selected UNICEF country
situation reports).
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Figure 3
MALNUTRITION AMONG CHILDREN IN BOTSWANA AND GHANA 1980-34
Bo tsw ana
Percen tag e  aged  1-4 years be lo w  80 per cent of the 
H arvard  standard  w e ig h t for age.
. 1984 
1983
Sources:
Background 
Papers for 
W orkshop  on Social 
and N utritional 
Su rve illance  in 
Eastern and 
Southern A frica  
UN ICEF Social 
Statistics Bu iletin . 
Vol. 5. N o .4. 1982.
G h an a
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Erosion of Security: Extension of Poverty
Meanwhile traditional security systems have been eroded - probably a trend 
well established in the 1960-79 period but much more nakedly evident since. 
Kinship and locality or origin groups are less able to support poor 
members/relatives - especially in urban and natural (or other) disaster 
stricken rural areas. This is not simply a result of shifts toward less 
extended families and urban residence, relevant as these are. With economic 
contraction fewer and fewer group members have resources (especially of cash 
or food) to spare - all boats are sinking lower. Similarly higher cost, less 
available transport reduces urban/rural kin and migrant contacts. Reciprocal 
exchange - food for manufactures - has probably risen, but this is not an 
avenue accessible to the very poor. To exchange one must have something above 
day to day subsistence (including the cost of a trip) to start.
The pattern and balance of absolute poverty have continued to shift. The
worst declines - excluding drought/war related famines - appear to have been
among urban poor (including for the first time a high proportion of recorded
wage employees). In consuming power terms they are now clearly worse off than
the majority of peasants and their former advantages in respect to access to
basic services and to chances of advancing to higher real incomes are
increasingly exiguous. Rural absolute poverty has grown unevenly with the
general rule of thumb being that households in peripheral areas
geographically, politically, in absolute agricultural potential or in 
12perceived commercialised production - have fared worse on production and 
service access quite apart from being particularly prone to drought and civil 
government collapse/war debacles.
It is still true that the majority of Sub-Saharan Africa's poorest of the poor 
are in refugee camps and peripheral rural areas but there is now a rapidly 
growing urban household category which is almost equally immiserised. In most 
of the region's economies the net resource flow - at existing prices - is 
urban to rural, as much in states with an urban as in the minority with a 
rural policy bias. Oddly the clearest exceptions are two Stabilisation/ 
Structural Adjustment cases, Ghana and Uganda, which are almost alone in
having very high export crop taxes. In respect to non-food crops it can be
claimed that price distortions hide a true rural to urban flow but with both
the trend and the post 1979 realignment of food crop prices in favour of
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producers over wage earners it is hard to argue the same for that sub-sector. 
This does not, however, mean equal access to basic services for rural areas 
because state revenues from rural households and producers are much lower than 
from mineral and urban so that expenditure proportional to revenue results in 
substantially higher per capita spending and service provision in urban areas 
(and for both rural and urban elites).
Table 1 set out the present levels of several Human Condition or Quality of 
Life indicators for Low Income Sub-Saharan Africa as of 1982 and their 
evolution in Ghana over 1960-84. The absolute levels are appalling enough but 
their Ghanaian evolution is even more dispiriting. Moderately rapid real 
gains in the 1 9 6 0s slowed down in the 1 9 7 0s and have now gone into reverse. 
Two immediate basic causal inadequacies stand out - food production and the 
budgetary base for health and education. While Ghana’s period of economic 
unsuccess dates to the early 1 9 6 0s, not 1 9 7 9 , the record of change on the 
Human Condition front does not appear atypical. What was hard won over two 
decades has been undermined, eroded and threatened with being totally swept 
away in seven years. The stifling scent of despair is there - not 
universally, not unconditionally but widely and increasingly.
Within African Reach?
Twenty five years in Sub-Saharan Africa much of it grappling with poverty 
issues should not - and for the author do not - lead either to any belief that 
there are simple answers nor that answers appropriate to one country at one 
time are easily generalisable or sustainable. The particular programmatic 
analysis of basic needs and employment oriented approaches in the 1 9 7 0 s was 
never widely accepted in or outside Africa and on reflection this contributor 
would be inclined to say it somewhat differently. In any case those 
programmes were within a resource availability context which is gone - it 
would be most unwise for anybody to be disposed to try to repeat them, 
unchanged. On the other hand their stress on the centrality of more 
production by poor households and more priority to basic services for 
production as well as for distribution and human welfare reasons was a basic 
rediscovery which, having been lost, needs to be won back. And won back in a 
form in which programme articulation for urgent implementation can be begun - 
no matter how unpropitious the context may seem.
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The need for such emergency action is in fact agreed in principle and in 
practice as - at a more speculative and non time targeted level - is that for 
basic service restoration, making possible increased production by poor 
peasants and, perhaps, enhancing opportunities for informal sector employment 
and productivity advances. However the longer term goals are often seen as 
after the crisis and after structural adjustment; the emergency actions tend 
to be episodic and case by case; the two phases are not articulated and 
programmed as a sequential whole and both sets of exercises are treated as 
parallel to (at worst as Christmas tree ornaments on) production and balance 
focused macro and sectoral structural adjustment. That is simply not good 
enough, intellectually or operationally.
Emergency action is essential because people are dying but also because 
ecological, production and basic service delivery system damage once sustained 
is very hard to reverse and, until reversed, will continue to cost lives. The 
most obvious emergency support measures are food aid and interim basic medical 
care against killing diseases and health conditions. These programmes are 
essential. UNICEF’s African poster with the question and answer bracketing 
the face of a young girl - ’What do you want to be when you grow up?’ ’Alive’ 
- sets the initial challenge starkly but realistically.
Continuity From Loud Emergency To Rehabilitation
However, emergency action in Sub-Saharan Africa will both need to be continued 
(not necessarily in the same areas) for a decade or more and to be seen as an 
initial phase of a broader struggle to reduce vulnerability and poverty by 
creating survival security structures based in Africa and involving poor 
Africans as producers and subjects not receivers and objects. This 
perspective has several implications for emergency programmes:
a. the question - after survival, what next? - should be posed from the 
start because of its implications for emergency programming. For example 
food aid so delivered as to allow peasants to remain in their homes, 
maintain their social units and prepare for the return of the rains is 
much more conducive to making survival the first step to self 
rehabilitation than food aid in mass camps of dislocated, totally
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dependent refugees;
b. similarly the same question implies that - e.g. - rural emergency food 
provision needs to be linked with the inputs (seed, tools, transport 
home, etc.) required for an economically wiped out household to begin to 
produce again;
c. in parallel, attempts to meet emergency health needs should go beyond 
specific injections - e.g. immunisation/vaccination campaigns and oral 
rehydration - to selective support for keeping a basic health service 
functioning, as illustrated by the UNICEF/Danida basic rural drug 
provision programme in Tanzania and the UNICEF inputs into selected 
primary health care posts in Ghana;
d. and utilise emergency inputs - where possible without delay or sclerotic 
bureaucratisation - to increase productive and basic service capacity and 
provide a capacity for self respect and dignity to participants (no 
longer pure recipents or ’targets'), e.g. Zimbabwe's rural public works 
scheme including agricultural infrastructure focused food (or cash to buy 
food) for work projects;
e. while involving recipients as participants in programme operation and - 
to the extent practicable - coverage and design.
None of these steps is impossible. The usual argument that in an emergency 
there is no time to take them implies that emergencies are few and far 
between, unforeseen and not susceptible to identifying overall guidelines for 
broader (as well as for food distribution or vaccination campaign) approaches.
That is nonsense. Emergency efforts have been needed frequently and 
repeatedly in Sub-Saharan Africa for over a decade. They will continue to be 
needed. The points outlined above are fairly commonly relevant to 
articulating programmes. African governments, international agencies, 
bilateral aid bodies and voluntary organisations can and should plan ahead 
both as to basic capacity to finance or collect more resources and as to basic 
programme designs and checklists. Combined with better early warning systems 
on food supply and health situation deterioration - and less unwillingness to 
believe and act on the data until people are visibly dying or on the verge of
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dying from starvation or epidemics - such an approach could both increase the 
human survival results of emergency programmes and make them infinitely more 
effective as first steps toward rehabilitation/self rehabilitation of 
recipients/participants.
Such an approach to emergency (human survival) programming has definite 
implications for longer term strategies and possibilities for reducing 
absolute poverty and absolute lack of access to basic services. First, if 
emergency assistance is to encompass initial rehabilitation it both should and 
can be seen within the context of longer term employment - food production - 
basic service - poverty reduction strategies both as an initial stage and also 
as a supporting measure to prevent their crippling or destruction when these 
strategies already existed before the emergency. Second, such a perspective 
suggests that the relatively watertight compartmentalisation of emergency 
assistance from development assistance is counter-productive for both and 
requires critical reassessment and 'structural adjustment'. Third, viewed in 
this way even emergency, human survival programmes are (or can be) relevant to 
sustaining and restoring human resources and production and therefore integral 
to, not an unwelcome diversion from, structural adjustment (cf Reutlinger,
1985).
And A Return Toward Development
Full articulation of longer term strategies is beyond the scope of this essay. 
However, some areas for attention can be flagposted.
First, the production/productivity focus of the present World Bank structural 
adjustment approach is crucial. Production is important. Production by poor 
people is a priority in, not a substitute for, raising production.
Second, the achievement of less severe external imbalance by a combination of 
higher exports, genuine import substitution and more concessional resource 
transfers is also necessary. Structural adjustment and growth of output are, 
at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, totally inconsistent with neo-autarchy. 
Import strangulation is a fact weighing heavily on poor people in at least 
half of the region. The true dialogue is on the nature of relationships to 
the world economy, balance of instruments, phasing and practicable timing.
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Third, unless government fiscal and monetary imbalances - and continuous 
resultant pressures for cuts - can be reduced, the chances of providing basic 
production support (extension, research, infrastructure, credit) and basic 
services to small peasant and/or non-agricultural informal sub-sectors are 
negligible. Prudent fiscal and monetary management is as integral to 
'economic adjustment with a human face' (c.f. UNICEF, 1985:64ff) as to any 
other variant of adjustment.
Fourth, because government resources (financial, human, physical, foreign 
exchange) are limited, priorities - i.e. choices as to what not to do as well 
as what is to be done - are necessary. For example if primary health care is 
to be expanded to universal access in Sub-Saharan Africa, then its share of 
health resources relative to limited access, high unit cost curative treatment 
must be expanded which may require absolute cuts in the latter. Similarly if
production enhancement by low income peasant farmers Í3 a priority then the 
research, extension, input supply and other requirements to make such an 
increase possible must be made available even though this means reducing 
allocations to large scale, mechanised, import intensive farming (an
alteration of balance likely to have positive production and external balance 
as well as poverty reduction results).
Up to this point what is proposed is not simply consistent with, but based on
the same priority themes as, conventional World Bank structural adjustment 
strategy and programming. At least at applied level (possibly not at 
philosophical) the differences are secondary. Production growth plus
manageable external and public finance balances are virtually always necessary 
conditions for significant improvement of the incomes and lives of poor 
people. However, they are rarely sufficient conditions. Therefore, a number 
of additional guideposts are needed.
Food: Production And Access
Fifth, increased food availability to poor people is a central goal (cf Bank,
1986). Given the external balance position, in all but a handful of cases, 
this means either enhanced production or balanced regional trade expansion. 
Food availability to the majority of ill nourished Africans who are members of
-2 7 -
•
poor peasant households, requires that they be enabled to produce more (cf 
Burki, 1985; Bank, 19 8 6 ). This is economically feasible - indeed much more 
cost efficient than most large scale agricultural programmes (Livingstone
1985) - and in the present food crises context probably politically and
intellectually feasible as well. The problem is partly technical 
articulating contextually relevant programmes based on collecting reasonably 
accurate data and testing/adapting new techniques for application. It is also 
partly institutional and partly resource management - actually giving priority 
to hoes and field testing, effective extension and availability of seasonal 
inputs on time. J None of these technical and institutional problems are 
inherently any harder to solve than those of other agricultural production 
promotion strategies. Similar considerations apply to enhancing poor peasant 
cash income which in most cases will come primarily from achieving a genuine 
food surplus above household self provisioning requirements. This is not to 
argue against increasing non-food crop production for industrial inputs (e.g. 
cotton) and for export. Sub-Saharan Africa's problem is one of low 
agricultural growth not substitution of non-food for food crops.
Sixth, effective food availability for poor urban (or other non-agricultural)
households turns on price/income relationships. Attempts to hold food prices
down by squeezing growers are counter-productive (especially if growers are
actually squeezed, less so if they simply use parallel markets) because they
reduce supply and either result in higher effective prices to low income
consumers or in unmanageable import and subsidy bills. Higher rural
productivity and larger supplies are much more likely to reduce real urban
food prices. Therefore, the concentration must be on raising incomes through
14more, and more productive , employment/self employment. How to do so is the 
basic question and one needing data (on what is produced how and on what the 
actual income sources of low income Sub-Saharan African households are as well 
as on technical and institutional production/employment/productivity 
possibilities), plus a coherent approach (not treating 'appropriate 
technology' or 'the informal sector' as isolated, homogenous artifacts which 
they are not) linked to a systematic attempt to treat employment/distribution 
and production/productivity issues as joint goals and programming exercises, 
not separate or alternative ones.
The World Employment Programme and subsequent African basic needs mission 
studies do provide a foundation for devising contextual approaches on these
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lines. The main obstacles - once better data bases are built - would appear 
to be political (the urban poor in Sub-Saharan Africa are neither represented 
in enough governing sub-class coalitions nor enough of a threat to their 
survival to receive priority attention in many countries) and intellectual 
(the depth and extent of urban poverty is still not fully comprehended, the 
limits of modernisation approaches are only beginning to be perceived, the 
somewhat faddy, sloppy and romantic approaches of some "intermediate 
technology" and "informal sector" true believers have created a climate of 
scepticism). The key crisis forcing rethinking is the growing realisation 
that with 3 per cent to 4 per cent annual economically active population 
growth to the end of the century, employment growth outside peasant 
agriculture and the large scale, capital intensive enterprise sector is 
essential. Enhanced productivity and greater production on the one hand give 
the possibility of having effective urban consumer access to food and basic 
consumer goods and on the other rural producer access to basic consumer goods 
and agricultural inputs. Both non-agricultural workers and peasants need to 
become less poor and to have incentives for raising productivity (and working 
longer) to raise marketed output of goods and services.
Seventh, raising peasant productivity in the short term is likely to be 
possible primarily through increasing availability of proven, desired inputs -
e.g. improved seed, hand tools, in some cases fertilisers and pesticides,
improving transport - processing - storage capacity, reducing delays in
payment to and distance from marketing point for peasants and increased rural 
and small town availability of goods (largely basic consumer, construction 
materials, aggricultural inputs and tools) peasant want to buy ("incentive
goods"). Knowledge to achieve major production breakthroughs is on a broad
front not available today (Lipton 1985; Burki 1985). However, because the 
presently available gains are short to medium term and rsearch takes time to 
yield results, it is critical that priority be given to retargeted applied and 
adaptive research regionally, nationally and sub-nationally linked to
International Crops Research Institute (ICRISAT) member and related 
institutional basic research. Potentially useable basic research has not - 
with limited, scattered exceptions - been field tested and adapted by
ecological zone, analysed in terms of its economic viability to users 
(especially peasant users) nor examined to ascertain its useability ("user 
friendliness") by small farmers in general and the majority of them who are 
women in particular. These defects are particularly true of root crops,
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traditional grains, and marginal (or sub-marginal) rainfall areas.
Eighth, universal access to basic services (health, education, water and
production support such as research and extension related to the two
preceeding priorities) within a finite time period (even if that must be up to
twenty or twenty five years) needs to be seen as an anti-poverty, food
production, productive employment and human condition priority. Poor people,
especially women and indigenous minorities, do benefit disproportionately from
broadening access because when access is constricted they are the ones
excluded. Literacy, nutrition, health and reduction of time spent collecting
water are critical to enhancing the ability to work harder and more
15productively now and over time. To articulate such priorities into costed, 
sustainable programmatic form is not impossible if: a.) non-essentials are cut 
out (e.g. via basic drug lists); b.) there is a real priority in personnel and 
policy allocation given to doing so. The obstacles are - especially for
health and water - intellectual and political. Low cost/universal access 
services are only now building up a cadre of professionals, a body of 
literature and a degree of respectability even remotely resembling that behind 
’state of the art' approaches whose costs are such as to render them largely 
non-functional or practical only on a limited access basis in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Piped water to houses and high quality curative medicine do appeal 
directly to political decision takers and civil servants (who use and - 
reasonably enough - want to have them). The balance in the intellectual 
dialogue is shifting toward low cost/universal access; the political self 
interest obstacle is very real and often very intractable in most of
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Protecting Vulnerable Groups and Ecologies
Ninth, basic survival and support mechanisms are needed because emergencies 
will continue to arise. People matter and the view of Nassau Senior that the 
Irish famine would not kill enough people to achieve adequate structural 
adjustment of population to land is not an acceptable political economic 
position today. Again there is a perfectly respectable production case - the 
reduction of dislocation caused by unforeseen and unprepared for emergencies 
could have a high payoff in reducing their immediate and subsequent negative
impact on growth. The problem is in devising approaches which do meet
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survival and preservation of 3elf rehabilitation potential needs while being
financially and institutionally feasible in specific Sub-Saharan African 
1contexts. A crucial set relate to food (see Reutlinger, 1985; Bank, 1986).
Pre planned food for work programmes (urban as well as rural) operating at
some level continuously but capable of being stepped up nationally or locally
when required are an example. So, where technically and financially feasible,
are food reserves linked to minimum buying price safety nets for peasant
producers in bumper crop years. Such an approach would also avert the danger
of food aid so depressing domestic crop prices in good years as to reverse the
production revival - a danger which is exacerbated by the long lag between
need and supply of food aid usually resulting in large deliveries in the six
17months after domestic supplies have become adequate. A related approach 
applies to sub-marginal agricultural/pastoral area residents. Here production 
returns to combined input and emergency relief (including food for work) 
programmes may well be low and the potential for sustained productivity 
increases problematic. However, in practice there is often nowhere else the 
human beings in these areas can go. If any value is placed on their survival 
and welfare, cost efficient programmes to ensure it are needed. Economic 
growth alone cannot proceed fast enough to. end chronic food insecurity for 
these people. Both because their lives do matter and because chronic food
insecurity reduces their productivity yet further, specific interventions in 
their favour - including improving their production capacity, providing 
additional income generating possibilities (e.g. seasonal works programmes) 
and emergency food and production input distribution - are needed (cf
Reutlinger, 1985).
Tenth, environmental and ecological protection should be rescued from its
European/North American upper middle class origins and related to the struggle 
against poverty and for sustainable production. Need can be as damaging
environmentally as greed but cannot be dealt with by the same instruments. 
E.g. deforestation (more accurately denudation by stripping all tree and bush 
cover) is disastrous in its impact on productivity and in its contribution to 
desertification (loosely defined), erosion and dust bowls. It also increases 
the burdens on women and girls (and reduces their ability to grow crops, 
attend school, secure medical attention, improve environmental sanitation). 
Tree planting (encouraged by extension services but basically carried out by 
rural residents and/or urban fuel oriented producer co-operatives) and 
alternative fuel development would appear to be the only practicable basic
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answers even if both require time and patience to build up an adequate, self 
sustaining basis.
Given the interaction between growing pressure on the land and ecological 
degredation it is tempting to identify population policy as a central medium 
term way out of a crisis. This is almost certainly a mis-specification for 
two reasons:
First, no conceivable change in birth rates would relieve either the present 
overload on many fragile economies or the rise in would-be economically active
populations to 2.000. For the human beings and the land, what is needed are
sustainable land use measures backed by . conservation and rehabilitation 
knowledge and resources.
Second, the historic evidence suggests that certain specific improvement in 
human conditions trigger falls in birth rates which then facilitate growth of 
per capita incomes and access to services rather than the birth rate falling 
first. The most common facilitating conditions appear to be falls in infant 
mortality and severe malnutrition and rises in perceived old age security nets 
and education levels (especially of women). Thus a number of the approaches 
proposed above can be seen as directed inter alia toward meeting preconditions 
for effective population policy. When they begin to be met response to family 
planning education and supporting services will rise and the slow buildup of 
use of the latter may well accelerate dramatically. Until then while building
an understanding of national and - especially - household demographic
realities and serving those wishing to plan their families is important it can 
neither greatly alter birth rates nor use large volumes of resources 
efficiently.
Resources: Finance, Participation, Acountability
Eleventh, budgetary balance should be restored primarily by increasing revenue 
not cutting services. In Sub-Saharan Africa, revenue to GDP ratios vary but 
some are almost incredibly low even for very low income countries. Universal 
access basic services cannot be provided primarily on a profit making basis 
both because large portions of them can operate only at a 'loss’ and because 
external economies are large. Within revenue augmentation, attention should
18
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be focused on selective (progressive to well above the poverty line) indirect
taxes and on progressive direct taxes which are in practice at least mildly
redistributive on both the revenue and - more particularly - the expenditure
side. Fees on limited access, high cost services (e.g. household water
connections, above average use household electricity and water bills, above
average health facility space and diet provision, specialist medical
treatment) are at least as justifiable on this basis as luxury consumer goods
taxes and are often fairly easy and low cost to collect. Charges for basic
services are more problematic. Unless a quick, effective waiver system at
contact point can be devised and operated, poor people, and especially their
children, will be excluded. If fees can be seen to relate to services (e.g. a
biannual borehole overhaul fee raised communally and paid when - and if - the
overhaul takes place; local contribution of agricultural work or food to allow
a primary health care worker to do health work without destroying the family
nutritional base) they can help mobilise resources, increase community support
and reduce net central government cost. Otherwise they will be very unpopular
in a context of fragile and often interrupted services. Large numbers of
small charges have high collection costs - not least in skilled personnel time
If, for example, nurses are expected to collect hundreds of small oral
19rehydration salts or vaccination fees as part of their daily work.
Twelfth, without participation by poor people no anti-poverty programme will 
be fully successful even in material terms. The case for participation in 
production and resource mobilisation (e.g. self help inputs of labour, 
materials, even cash into basic service and infrastructure provision) is 
presumably self evident. What is less accepted is that poor people need to 
participate in programme design, ongoing management and monitoring/evaluation. 
The reasons are not romantic - poor people do have knowledge about their own 
needs and capabilities which experts do not; participation in production and 
'takeup' of services is related to whether they do correspond and are 
responsive to users' needs and preferences; participation can create 
incentives for officials to be more responsive to poor people (a not 
inconsiderable factor in programme success however good or weak the initial 
design); self help resource mobilisation is practicable only if those who are 
to mobilise the resources believe their use is appropriate, for their benefit 
and at least partially under their control. The political and institutional 
obstacles to participation (and the real, if partial and limited, successes in 
overcoming them) do not need rehearsing and are not limited to Sub-Saharan
* •
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Africa. They need to be seen as conflicts to be contained, circumvented or 
overcome not as given and immutable barriers to action.
Participation - and accountability - pose special problems for external bodies 
including multilateral, bilateral and voluntary aid or development agencies. 
This is true even when they are intellectually committed to participation and 
to accountability to intended beneficiaries. First, almost by definition 
their personnel are ’outsiders’ usually with faily brief country experience 
and broad perception gaps or distance from host government officials and 
intellectuals let alone African peasants, urban slum dwellers, women and 
children. Second, their structures of accountability run (usually 
hierarchically) through their own institution to its policy makers and those 
to whom it is acocuntable, not to host governments and through them to 
ordinary Africans much less directly to the latter. In a sense these tensions 
are not fully soluble (barring participatory, accountable, effective world 
government which, however desirable, cannot reasonably be posed as a side 
condition for the struggle against poverty in Africa). However, posing them 
and facing them squarely is potentially a necessary first step toward reducing 
tensions to manageable levels, improving host-agency relationships and to 
avoiding the escalation of tensions into antagonistic contradictions and the 
deterioration of dialogue into accusatory rhetoric.
External Involvement And Support
Thirteenth, while any strategy for overcoming poverty must be based on the 
actions of poor people and poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, if it is to 
have a real chance of sustainable success, external support is critical. The 
resources available domestically are too limited and the exogenous shocks too 
great for any strategy depending wholly on domestic resources to be more than 
problematic in results or more than excruciatingly slow in paying off 
(especially for its intended beneficiaries and participants). The need for 
real resource - including knowledge - transfers (from other developing 
countries as well as from industrial ones) is as great in respect to the 
broader as to the narrower aspects of structural adjustment.
Fourteenth, one ’resource' of which less is needed is pre-emptive or coercive 
advice. Imposed programmes rarely survive the crisis stick or the resource
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carrot - even if they are inherently sound. Only Africans are primarily 
concerned about and able to achieve the development of Africa. The record of 
expert model solutions to African problems is - to say the least - not very 
good, partly at least because these models almost always lack contextual, 
temporal and technical knowledge Africans (often poor Africans) possess and 
their expert designers did not. Nowhere is this warning truer than in 
relation to peasant production and especially peasant food production.
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Table 4 . G row th of A griculture
Average annual grcnvth rate of 
volume of production (percent)
Average annual growth rate of 
total production per capita (percent)
Food
Total
agriculture Food
Total
agriculture
1960-70 1970-82 1960-70 1970-82 1960-70 1970-82 1960-70 1970-82
Low -incom e econ o m ies 3 .2  w 1.0 w 3.1  w 0 .7  w 1.0 w - 1 . 2  w 0 .9 -w - 1 . 4  w
L o w - in c o m e  s e m ia r id 2.1 w 2 .8  w 2 .3  w 2 .8  w - 0 . 5  w - 0 . 1  w - 0 . 2  w -0 .1  w
1 Chad - 0 . 3 2.4 0.2 2.1 - 2.2 0 .4 - 1 . 7 0.1
2 Mali 1.3 2.5 1.6 2 7 - 1.2 - 0.2 - 0 . 9 0.0
3 Burkina Faso 3.2 2.4 3.5 2,5 1.2 0.4 1.5 0.5
4 Som alia 2.8 1.0 2.8 1.0 0.0 - 1.8 0.0 - 1.8
5 Niger 2 7 4.1 2.7 4.0 - 0 . 7 0.8 - 0 . 7 0.7
6 G am b ia ,  The 4.3 - 1.0 4.3 •1.0 2.1 - 4 . 1 2.1 - 4 . 1
L o w - in c o m e  o t h e r 3 .3  w 0 .9  w 3 .2  w 0 .6  w 1.2  w - 1 . 4  w 1.1 w - 1 . 6  w
7 Ethiopia 2.9 1.7 3.0 1.5 0.5 - 0 . 3 0.6 - 0 . 5
8 G u in ea-B issau 0 .7 0 .7
9 Zaire 4.3 1.3 4.1 1.2 2.3 - 1 . 7 2.1 - 1 . 7
10 Malawi 4.9 2.9 4.7 3.5 2.0 - 0.1 1.8 0.5
11 U gan da 3.4 1.7 3.4 0.5 0.4 - 1.0 0.4 - 2.1
12 Rw an d a 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.7 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.3
13 Burundi 4.6 1.6 4.6 1.7 3.2 - 0.6 3.2 - 0 . 5
14 Tanzania 5.5 2.1 5.0 1.0 2.7 - 1 . 3 2.2 - 2 . 3
15 Benin 3.2 2.6 3.8 2.4 0.6 - 0.1 1.2 - 0 . 3
16 C entra l  African Rep. 0.8 1.9 1.3 1.8 - 0.8 - 0.2 - 0 . 3 - 0 . 3
17 G u in e a ■> - 1.5 2.7 1.4 1.2 - 0 . 5 1.2 - 0.6
18 M adag ascar 2.7 1.7 2.7 1.6 0.5 - 0 . 9 0.5 - 1.0
19 Togo 5.5 2.3 5.4 2.3 2.4 - 0 . 3 2.3 - 0 . 3
20 G h a n a 2.6 - 0.2 2.6 •0.2 0.3 - 3 . 1 0.3 - 3 . 1
21 K enva 3.6 2.0 3.3 2.7 0 .4 - 1 . 9 0.1 - 1.2
22 Sierra  Leone 3.7 1.2 3.6 1.2 2.0 - 0.8 1.9 - 0.8
23 M ozam bique 2.3 - 1.0 2.0 ■1.4 0.2 - 5 . 1 - 0.1 - 5 . 5
M id d le-in com e oil im porters 3 .7  w 3 .3  w 3.8  w 2.5  w 0 .7  w - 0 . 6  w 0 .7  w - 1 . 2  w
24 S u d an 5.4 2.9 5.4 1.6 3.1 - 0 . 3 3.1 - 1.6
25 Mauritania 2.1 1.4 2.1 1.3 - 0.2 - 0 . 9 - 0.2 - 1.0
26 Liberia 0.4 3.0 3.3 2.1 — ? - 0 . 5 0.1 - 1 . 4
27 Seneg a l - 0 . 4 1.5 - 0 . 3 1.3 - 2.6 - 1.2 - 2 . 5 - 1 . 4
28 Lesotho 0.1 0.2 0.4 ■0.2 - 1 . 9 - 2.1 —1.6 - 2 . 5
29 Z am bia 3.5 1.8 3.1 1.7 0.9 - 1 . 3 0.5 - 1 . 4
30 Z im b ab w e 1.5 1.6 0.6 1 1 - 2.0 - 1.6 - 2 . 9 - 1.0
31 Botsw ana 0.9 - 2.0 0.9 ■2.0 - 1 . 7 - 6.0 - 1 . 7 - 6.0
32 Sw aziland 8.8 3.9 8.6 4.5 5.9 0 .7 5.7 1.3
33 tvorv C oast 5.2 6.0 5.5 5.0 1.4 1.0 1.7 0.1
34 M auritius 1.5 0.8 1.5 0.9 - 0 . 7 - 0.6 - 0 . 7 - 0 . 5
M id d le-in com e oil exporters 1.1 w 2 .4  w 1.1 w 2 .3  w - 1 . 4  w - 0 . 3  w - 1 . 4  w - 0 . 7  w
35 Nigeria 0.5 2.5 0.4 2.4 - 2.0 - 0.1 - 2.0 - 0.2
36 C a m er o on 4.6 2.1 4.3 2.0 2.5 - 0 . 9 2.7 - 1.0
37 C on go ,  P eop le 's  Rep. - 2.8 0 .9 - 2 . 7 0.9 - 5 . 1 - 2.0 - 5 . 0 - 2.0
38 G a b o n 3.3 0 .7 3.3 0.6 2.9 - 0 . 7 2.9 - 0.8
39 A ngola 2.8 0.4 3.0 •3.0 0 .7 - 2.0 0.9 - 5 . 4
S u b -S ah aran  A frica 2.5 w 1.7 w 2.5  w 1.4 w 0 .2  w - 0 . 9  w 0 .2  w - 1 . 1  w
\'ote: For data comparabil ity  and coverage see the technical notes.
Source: The World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action, 1984.
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Notes
1. See, for example, T. Rose (Ed) 1985 Crisis and Recovery In Sub-Saharan
Africa: Realities And Complexities; R. H. Green (Guest Ed.) 1985
Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards oblivion or reconstruction, No. 15 of
Journal of Development Planning; 1985; P. Ndeqwa, L. P. Mureithi and R. 
H. Green (Eds), Development Options For Africa In The 1980*3 and Beyond, 
Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1985; World Bank, Toward Sustained
Development In Sub-Saharan Africa:____ A Joint Programme Of Action,
Washington, 1984.
2. Governors' sometimes did, by the nature of their posts, take a more 
territorially self contained view with some impact on territorial, but 
much less on overall, colonial policy.
3. A reading of a random selection of colonial bluebooks, reports, minutes 
and semi-analytical pieces - including Fabian ones on endeavours such as 
the post 1945 groundnut schemes - rapidly brings home the colonial 
economy in the service of the metropolitan economy focus, as opposed to 
African welfare or even overall territorial development, of colonial 
conceptualisation even when dealing with topics such as wages, 
employment or peasant production. Again some governors - for example, 
Sir Gordon Guggisberg in the Gold Coast and Lord Lugard in Nigeria - 
were partial exceptions even if rather technocratic and paternalistic in 
their approach to the welfare of Africans and conceptually shaky in 
their delineation of how to expand territorial production.
4. In German East Africa (Tanzania) examination of German tombstones 
suggests that diseases killed at least one German per mile of rail 
built, while West Africa's European health condition was as much 
described as charicatured by the tag 'The Bight of Benin where many go 
in; but few come out again'.
5. Unpublished Tanzania data suggest a 3 to 2 ratio of minimum wage 
consuming power to that of the average peasant household; scattered West 
African estimates include several of the same order in the mid-1970s. 
Much higher estimates usually compare peasant cash incomes with ail 
urban income earners or value peasant self provisioning in food at 
farmgate prices and worker food at urban retail prices both of which 
distorts real consuming power differentials.
6 . Centred on the ILO's World Employment Programme and "Basic Needs" 
conceptualisation (c.f. Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One World 
Problem, ILO, Geneva, 1976) and the World Bank's "Absolute Poverty" 
conceptualisation and projects toward its eradication.
7. In fact in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa a fairly steady post 
1 9 7 0 increase in policies aimed at enhancing growth of food production 
backed by generally increased resource allocations have paralleled a 
worsening achieved output growth trend despite grower price/urban wage 
terms of trade shifts in favour of domestic food over most of the 
period. There are exceptions and it is probable that the causal 
relationship run from the negative output trend to the policy/resource
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packages and not vice versa, but even on the most favourable reading 
policy was not in fact effective and resource allocations were not 
efficient in production payoff terms.
8. See sources cited at Note 5 especially Towards oblivion or 
reconstruction (contributions by S. Please and R. H. Green) and Toward 
Sustained Development.
9. Real wage falls of over 50 per cent since the mid-1970s are common and 
75 per cent ones not uncommon. Given base levels of consumption these 
must have been partially offset by rises in other components of 
household income. Otherwise the household members would literally be 
unhoused, naked and starving or dead.
10. The accuracy of these data is certainly open to question. 80* averages 
taken literally would imply starvation was rampant among at least the 
bottom fifth of the food distribution and 68% would suggest half the 
people were in the grip of a major famine. There is some reason to 
believe FAO (and national) estimates in some countries understate food 
availability and that up to a point low height and weight represent 
adaptation to conditions of low food availability which do reduce 
minimum nutritional levels consistent with health. However, there is no 
reason to doubt the pattern of declining availability shown in many 
cases for over a decade and for almost all since the late 1970s. 
Equally, adaptation cannot explain the high and rising levels of 
clinical malnutrition in children which are based on less globalistic 
criteria nor explain away the very real micro and qualitative evidence 
of chronic inability to work hard, to study effectively, to benefit from 
;health care which are reported, even under non-famine conditions, in 
most SSA countries.
11. Thus Northern and Upper Ghana are usually perceived as food deficit 
areas. In nutritional terms they most certainly are. But they are 
substantial net food (yams, groundnuts, cattle and to a lesser extent 
millet and guinea corn) exporters to the rest of Ghana and to Burkina 
Faso except in the most severely drought affected years because most 
peasant households have no alternative way of meeting basic cash 
purchase requirements. (The regional rice surplus is less relevant to 
the argument as it comes from land extensive, capital intensive, large, 
mechanised farms not peasant growers.)
12. Perceptions may be wrong - see, e.g Note 26 - but if acted on they do 
have objective results and are a real cause of decisions.
13. For a programmatic sketch see P. Daniel, M. Lipton, R. H. Green in 
Towards oblivion or reconstruction, op cit.
14. Higher productivity is basic - in the context of most informal sectors 
in Sub-Saharan Africa - to higher real incomes. Reduction of 
exploitation may often also be necessary, but until they are able to 
raise their productivity most informal sector employees/self employed 
cannot achieve minimum adequate household incomes no matter how fairly 
they are paid for what they produce.
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15.
16 .
17.
18.
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Interestingly, the World Bank’s variant of the 'new conventional wisdom’ 
has never fully lost sight of this point and has recently begun to 
reassert it. Some of the production oriented justifications of 
education and health are rather distressingly formulated - they would 
make equal sense if the ’objects’ discussed were machines or cattle - 
but the underlying point that the productionist case reinforces the 
human concern one for basic services is an important and powerful one.
Contexts - not the Sub-Saharan African context. For example, food 
stamps for poor households might be a fiscally and administratively 
feasible food security approach in Mauritius but pretty clearly not in - 
say - Mauretania. Similarly large inter year grain storage may make 
little sense in Botswana which is bordered by two large grain exporters 
and has a relatively satisfactory foreign exchange position; in Zambia 
both foreign exchange constraints and the need to restructure the 
economy away from mining point in the other direction.
This may be unfair to decision takers. With crop yields uncertain until 
harvest and the procurement/shipment time required long, it is prudent 
not to close down food aid (or other import) pipelines prematurely. 
However, the same cure of minimum grower prices and reserve stocks would 
fit equally well to alleviate the problems resulting from such prudence.
The role of better stoves is controversial. Those developed are with 
few exceptions so unpopular as to suggest serious design or overlooked 
side effect weaknesses. In any case substituting a purchased stove for 
three stones to save wood produced (collected) by direct labour input is 
not a practical prescription for poor rural households to follow.
The critique on the grounds of collection cost is far from radical - it 
is standard Treasury practitioner wisdom agrregated from experience. 
That on indirect costs to unpaid collectors is not one Treasuries are so 
prone to make, but is one they recognise and to a degree accept - 
precisely because their experience is that heavy collection burdens on 
non-Treasury institutions or enterprises result in protests, need to pay 
collection fees and/or very poor collection rates. Many of the detailed 
fee schemes proposed appear to be ’academic’ or ’ideological’ in the 
perjorative sense - it is hard to suppose their authors have any 
knowledge of revenue management and collection realities and on occasion 
charging the user seems to be the goal in and of itself whether the net 
revenue secured is substantial, negligible or even negative. Perhaps 
the author is biased because for nine years he was a practising Treasury 
civil servant responsible inter alia for devising administratively 
feasible and cost efficient revenue measures and structures.
' * g» ^
Sources and References
Agarwala, R. 19865. ’Resource Requirements for Restoring Growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa’ in J. Williamson (ed), African Debt and 
Financing, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Allison, C. and R. H. Green (eds), 1985. 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Getting the 
Facts Straight, IDS Bulletin Vol 16(3)> July.
 , 1983. 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa - What Agendas for
Action?' IDS Bulletin Vol 14(1), January.
Burki., S. J., 1 9 8 5 . ’The African Food Crisis: Looking Beyond The Emergency", 
Conference on South-South Cooperation: Experiences and Prospects,
Harare, November, to be published by Third World Foundation.
Daniel, P., R. H. Green and M. Lipton, 1985. 'A strategy for the rural poor'
Journal of Development Planning No 15.
FAQ, 1985a. Food Aid Bulletin. No. 2, Rome.
 , 1985b. Food Situation in African Countries Affected by Emergencies,
Special Report, Rome.
 , 1986. Food Crop Outlook In Sub-Saharan Africa, Rome.
Green, R. H. (guest ed) 1985a. 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards Oblivion or
Reconstruction' Journal of Development Planning No. 15.
 , 1985b. 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Overall Economic Malaise and Food production
Crisis' in Famine in Africa, House of Commons Paper 5o, HMSO, London, 
pp 149-153.
 , 1985c. 'From deepening economic malaise towards renewed development: an
overview' Journal of Development Planning No 15.
 , 1985d. 'IMF Stabilisation and structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan
Africa: are they technically compatible?' IDS Bulletin Vol 16(3), 
July.
 , 1986a. "The IMF and Stabilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical
Review", IDS Discussion Paper 216, June
1986b. "Sub-Saharan Africa: Poverty of Development, Development of
Poverty", IDS Discussion Paper 218, July
International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1976. Employment Growth and Basic 
Needs: A One World Problem Geneva.
Livingstone, I., 1 9 8 5 . "Choices for Rural and Urban Development: The Case for
an Employment Focus" in Ndegwa _et al, 19 8 5 .
*<*1 ^
- i i -
Ndegwa, P., L. Mureithi and R. H. Green (eds), 1985 Development Options for 
Africa in the 1980s and Beyond Oxford University Press, Nairobi.
Please, S., 1985. ’Summary and highlights of the World Bank joint action
programme' Journal of Development Planning No 15.
Reutlinger, S., 1985. 'Food Security and poverty in LDCs' , Finance and
Development, Vol. 22-4, December.
Rodney, W., 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L'overture, London.
Rose, T. (ed) 1985. Crisis and Receovery in Sub-Saharan Africa: Realities and 
Complexities, Development Centre, OECD, Paris.
SADCC, 1985. ’An Illustrative assessment of the Cost of Destabilisation of the 
Member States of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference', Memorandum to OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, SADCC, Gaborone.
Singer, H. W. and R. H. Green, 1984 'Sub-Saharan Africa in depression: the
impact on the welfare of children', World Development (Special Issue 
on The Impact of World Recession on Children) March.
UNCTAD, 1985. The Least Developed Countries 1985 Report, Addendum Chapter 1, 
"Socio-Economic Development In The Least Developed Countries Since 
1980, C. Food and Agriculture", TD/3/AC.17/25/Add. 1(C), Geneva.
UNICEF, 1985a. Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries, New York, 
April.
1985b. Within Human Reach, New York.
 , 1984. The State of the World's Children, New York.
United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, 1985. Africa 
Emerency, No. 1, April-May.
Wheeler, D., 1984. "Sources of Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa", World
Development, Jan. vol 12, no. 1.
World Bank, 19 8 6 . (Reutlinger, S. and van Holst Pellekaan, J. _et al) Poverty 
and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing
Countries.
_, 1984. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint 
Programme of Action, Washington, D.C.
_, 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for
Action, Washington, D.C.
World Food Programme, 1985a. Annual Report Of The Executive Director On The 
Development Of The Programme: 1984, Rome.
_, 1985b. Review Of Food Aid Policies And Programmes, Rome.
